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N.Y. Supp. 745, 162 Misc. (N.Y.) 491 (i937). Where those patrons
who did pay to attend the theatre on the day of the drawing, as well as
those who did not attend, had a chance to win the award, the admission
price paid by some of the potential winners is held to be sufficient con-
sideration to brand the plan as a lottery. Jorman v. State, 54 Ga. A.
738, i88 S.E. 925 (1936); City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co.,
100 S.W. (2d) 695 (936); Commonwealth v. Wall, 3 N.E. (2d)
28 (1936) ; Central States Theatre Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enter-
prises, 276 Mich. 127, 267 N.W. 602 (936).
Thus, to outlaw a device, scheme, or game under the gaming stat-
utes, it is necessary to find the element of chance thwarting the element
of skill involved, or the chance appearing in the amount of the prize the
player way win. The game must be played for money or other valuable
thing, which may include property, or merely amusement or entertain-
ment, in addition to the goods which the patron professes to buy. To
hold a scheme illegal as a lottery it is necessary to find the elements of
chance, prize, and consideration. The consideration need not be a pe-
cuniary one flowing from the patron directly to the operator of the lot-
tery, but may be found to be any benefit to the operator, though it comes
to him from some other source, and not directly from the patron.
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EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE -WIRE
TAPPING
The defendants were charged with smuggling alcohol, possessing
and concealing smuggled alcohol, and conspiracy to smuggle and conceal
alcohol. Much of the evidence was secured by the wire tapping activities
of Federal agents. The defendants were convicted and the result
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. U. S. v. Nardone, 90 Fed.
(2d) 630; certiorari granted, 58 S. Ct. 27, 82 L. Ed. Adv. Op. II
(1937). Section 6o5 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6o5, 48 Stat. 1103 (June 19, 1934), provides that
cno person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any com-
munication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purpose, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person." On the basis of this section the United States Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of conviction, Justices Sutherland and McRey-
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nolds dissenting. Nardone v. U. S.,--U.S.-, 82 L. Ed. 250, 58 S. Ct.
275 (1937)-
The majority held in Nardone v. U. S., supra, that the word "per-
son" included agents of the Federal Government. The dissent argued
that such a construction was not necessary and should not be adopted,
since it would be such an aid to criminals and a handicap to the govern-
ment. Nothing was said about such evidence being a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. But in the absence of a violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution or a similar amendment of a
state constitution, "the common law rule is that the admissibility of
evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means by which it was
obtained." See opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Olmstead v. U. S.,
277 U. S. 438, at 467, 72 L. Ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564, 66 A.L.R. 376
(1928). See also: 4 ,Vigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2183; 13 Minn. L.R. i,
58 (1928); 53 A.L.R. 1485, 66 A.L.R. 397. As observed by Jones
in his "Commentaries on Evidence," Vol. 5, Sec. 2075, note 3, "Where
there is no violation of a constitutional guarantee, the verity of the above
quotation is absolute."
Under the Federal rule evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is not admissible. At least half the states, following the
lead of New York in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 15o N.E. 585;
certiorari denied 270 U. S. 657, 46 S. Ct. 353, 70 L. Ed. 784 (1926),
and Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138
N.E. ii (1923), admit the evidence on the ground that a violation of
law by an officer is no reason why a guilty criminal should escape.
4 Xigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2183; State v. Reynolds, ioi Conn. 224,
125 Ad. 636 (1924); Hall v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727, 121 S.E.
154 (1924); see also: 20 Ky. L.J. 354 (negative view), 358 (positive
view) (932), 24 Ky. L.J. 191 (936), 23 Va. L. Rev. 84 (936).
Ohio has recently adopted this view in State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St.
i66, 2 N.E. (2d) 255, 5 Ohio Op. 538 (1936). The two rules are
discussed in detail in 3 O.S.LJ. 73-
In 1928, the Supreme Court was confronted with the specific ques-
tion whether the use of evidence of private telephone conservations be-
tween the defendants and others, intercepted by Federal prohibition
officers tapping telephone wires off the premises, amounted to a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Olmstead v. U. S., supra. Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Taft, speaking for the court with Justices Van Devanter, McRey-
nolds, Sutherland, and Sanford concurring, asserted that the language
of the Amendment could not be broadened to protect telephone wires
reaching from the defendant's house to the whole world; and that this
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situation did not come within the rule followed in Gouled v. U.S.)
255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1921), since there was
no actual entrance into the private quarters of defendant nor taking
away of something tangible. He observed that the Gouled case, supra,
carried the inhibition against unreasonable searches and seizures to the
extreme limit. The court followed the common law rule that the
unethical manner of obtaining the evidence did not make it inadmis-
sible and declared that a standard which would forbid the reception of
such evidence would make society suffer and give criminals greater
immunity than had been known heretofore. The court decided that the
Washington statute, Remington Compiled Statutes, 1922, Sec. 2656-
18, or Remington's Revised Statutes of Washington, Vol. 4, Sec. 265 6-
i8 (932), making interception of telephone messages a misdemeanor
did not affect rules of evidence in Federal criminal trials but that con-
gress might protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them,
when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in such trials, by direct legis-
lation. Mr. Justice Holmes in the Olmstead case, supra, called the
conduct of the Prohibition officers "dirty business," and said that less
evil would result from a few criminals going unpunished, than from
permitting the government to play an ignoble part by paying for other
crimes in law enforcement. In a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Brandeis
declared that present-day inventions and the inevitable progress of science
in the immediate future necessitated a broader interpretation of the
language of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to include the scien-
tific means by which the government may invade a man's home and
private life. Mr. Justice Butler was of the opinion that a broad view
should be taken of constitutional safeguards when personal rights were
concerned. Mr. Justice Stone concurred in most of the other dissenting
opinions.
On the basis of the United States Supreme Court decision in the
Olmstead case, supra, the lower Federal courts admitted evidence ob-
tained by wire tapping in all cases presented. Kerns v. U. S., 50 Fed.
(2d) 602 (93); Morton v. U.S., 6o Fed. (2d) 696; certiorari
denied, 288 U.S. 607, 77 L.Ed. 9 82, 53 S. Ct. 401 (1932); Foley
v. U. S., 64 Fed. (2d) i; certiorari denied, 289 U.S. 762, 77 L. Ed.
1505, 53 S- Ct. 796 (1933); Bushouse v. U. S., 67 Fed. (2d) 843
(1933); Beard v. U. S., 82 Fed. (2d) 837 (936); U. S. v. Nardone,
90 Fed. (2d) 630 (1937); Smith v. U. S., 91 Fed. (2d) 556 (i937).
Several bills were introduced and a congressional investigation of the wire
tapping activities of Federal officers was conducted during this period, but
no acts were passed relative to the admissibility of such evidence. The
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appropriation for the Bureau of Prohibition in the Department of Justice
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1934, 47 Stat. 1381 (Mar. x,
1933), contained a provision that no part of the appropriation could be
used to sponsor wire tapping in securing evidence of violations of the
National Prohibition Act. In 1934, Congress enacted the Federal Com-
munications Act, supra, (the relevant part of Sec. 605 is set out above).
This section is almost identical with Sec. 27 of the Radio Act of 1927,
44 Stat. at L., Pt. II Pub. Laws, I172, except that control over wire
messages is also given to the new commission. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia did not mention the Communi-
cations Act in admitting evidence secured by wire tapping in the case of
Beard v. U. S., sufra, and in Smith v. U. S., supra, it held that Sec. 605
did not render such evidence inadmissible. The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, Second Circuit, in U. S. v. Nardone, supra, followed this view
with the comment that since Congress had not seen fit to adopt the sug-
gestion of the Olmstead case, supra, by making evidence obtained by
wire tapping inadmissible in evidence by direct legislation, it was bound
to enforce the law of that case.
However, Mr. Justice Roberts, giving the opinion of the Supreme
Court in the principal case, found in Section 6o5 of the Communications
Act the plain mandate of Congress that the secrecy of telephone mes-
sages should be protected. "Person" as used in the section was inter-
preted to include federal agents, and the ban on communication "to any
person" prohibited testimony in court. The statement in the majority
opinion that "Congress may have thought it less important that some
offenders should go unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort
to methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive
of personal liberty," Nardone v. U. S., supra, seems reminiscent of Mr.
Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in the Olmstead case, supra.
In a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Mr. Justice McReynolds,
Mr. Justice Sutherland argued that in view of the failure of Congress
to pass all bills directly on the subject, if Congress had intended to
shackle the hands of federal officers it would have done so in a more
definite manner than by using the word "person". He contended that
the vast difference betveen interception by curious inter-meddlers and
by government officers acting under orders from the Attorney General
warranted the exclusion of federal officers from the prohibition of Sec-
tion 605. The policy argument of this opinion is in accord with the
majority opinion of Mr. Justice Taft in the Olmstead case. Mr. Justice
Sutherland pointed out that several bills had been introduced expressly
prohibiting federal agents from tapping wires, and that none of them
were passed.
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It will be noted that of the five justices who voted for conviction
in the Olmstead case, three were no longer members of the Supreme
Court when the Nardone case was decided; and that the other two voted
for conviction in the latter case. Only one of the four dissenting justices
in the former case is no longer a member, and the remaining justices
voted against conviction in the principal case. The justices who have
since been appointed also voted against conviction in the principal case.
The court now seems definitely committed to the proposition that evi-
dence secured by the wire tapping of Federal agents is inadmissible in
the Federal courts, but the policy of the doctrine seems questionable.
WILLIs R. DEMING
FIXTURES
PRIORITY OF LIEN-CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT OR CHAT-
TEL MORTGAGE OVER REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
The vendor installed two hot-air furnaces in a dwelling house,
under a conditional sale contract, filed July 16, 1932, in which it was
agreed that the furnaces should remain personal property, and removed
two furnaces then upon the premises. The furnaces were held in place
by their own weight and attached to pipes and ducts already on the
premises. At the time of the installation the realty was mortgaged to
the Central United National Bank of Cleveland, which mortgage the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation paid on or about January 7, 1934,
and took a first mortgage of the realty without actual notice of the
conditional sale. In an action between the assignee of the contract and
the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the Court of Appeals held that
the furnaces were a part of the realty, and that the mortgagee of the
realty had a superior right to the furnaces. Twentieth Century Heating
& Ventilating Co. v. Home Owners' Loan Corporation, 56 Ohio App.
188, IO N.E. (2d) 229, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 56, 8 Ohio Ops. 237
(1937).
In order to determine the rights of a conditional vendor or chattel
mortgagee and a mortgagee of the land it must first be ascertained
whether the property covered by the agreement has lost its character as
personalty and become a part of the realty. That, for so much as
remains personal property, the vendor or chattel mortgagee has priority
over the real estate mortgagee. See: Chase Manufacturing Co. v. Gar-
yen, 45 Ohio St. 289, 13 N.E. 493, 90 D.R. 501 (1887); Keeler v.
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